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The objective of this study Is to 
explore the concept oT postponement as 
it relates to capital budgeting deci¬ 
sions* It is the hypothesis or this 
study that the decision to postpone in¬ 
vestment projects, as distinct from the 
decision to accept or reject those pro¬ 
jects, till, under certain circumstances, 
allow the firm to fulfill its financial 
objectives to a greater extent than ia 
provided by traditional capital budget¬ 
ing theory. 
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On# of the most basic and continuous series 
of decisions facing business management in gen* 
eral, and the financial manager in particular, 
is of a dual nature: ‘ Where shall we put oul? S resent funds (capital employed in the firm) to 
est use in the interest of the owners of the 
enterprise, or, where shall we obtain additional 
resources (new capital added to the firm) to 
apply to the unfulfilled needs and opportunities 
we see in the enterprise?M1 
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 
The financial management function in any business en¬ 
terprise is the administration of the flow of funds avail¬ 
able to the firm* For specialised purposes the term ”funds” 
is sometimes used in reference to cash or near-cash assets 
or working capital* Used in this context the term ”funds1 
refers to the entire physical asset worth or total resources 
of the firm. 
The operations of a firm involve the conversion of 
these resources into noncash stocks of assets, and then 
reconversion of these stocks back to cash through the sale 
of goods. This process represents the flow of funds through 
the firm and is illustrated, in simplified form, in Figure 1. 
The stocks of assets are under the direct control of 
the several functional areas present in the firm. The 
funds committed for fixed assets and raw materials are 
^Erich A. Helfert, Techniques of Financial Analysis (Home- 
wood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1963), p. 3* 
PiC 1 
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administered by the production area; funds committed for 
labor are managed by the personnel area; funds committed 
for selling and administration are controlled and directed 
by the marketing sector. The financial sector is respon¬ 
sible for the over-all collection and distribution of the 
asset wealth. 
The movement of funds is initiated by the use of funds 
for the purchase of goods or materials. The funds may be 
derived from capital contributed by the owners, credit 
extended to the firm, or by reduction of cash or other 
assets owned by the firm. At the same time additional funds 
are committed to the costs of production and operation 
through expenditures for direct labor, administration and 
overhead under the control of the production sector, and 
finished goods are produced. The sale of finished goods 
is carried out under the control of the marketing sector. 
If the sales are for cash, the funds will flow directly 
back to the cash reservoir. If the sales are on credit, the 
effect is to shift funds from the stock of finished goods 
to the stock of accounts receivable. Collection of the 
receivables will result in flow of funds from the stock of 
receivables to the cash reservoir. This process is contin¬ 
uous, with the funds of the firm always flowing from one 
stock to another and fixilly returning to the cash reservoir 
to be used again. 
3- 
The earnings of the firm are determined by both the 
turnover of the stocks (or rapidity of the flow) and the 
margin provided by the flow* If the margin ia positive 
(that is, if the benefit received from sale of the product 
is greater than the outlay required to produce and sell 
It), the level of earnings will be determined by the number 
of times the stock of finished goods Is sold or turned over. 
This will result in e net Increase In the level of the cash 
reservoir. Unprofitable operations will result in a net 
decrease in the level of the cash reservoir. 
The flow of funds currently available to the firm is 
augmented by additional borrowing, sale of securities, 
and sale of fined assets. Combined with expenditures for 
major investment outlays, the regulation of the flow repre¬ 
sents the major area of decisions facing financial manage¬ 
ment. Through regulation of the flow, the financial man¬ 
agement can maximise the earnings of the enterprise through 
increasing the turnover of assets, increasing the margin 
provided by the flow, or both. Uncertainty about the effects 
of present decisions due to future events permeates all of 
the decisions of financial management because of technolo¬ 
gical, competitive, end managerial risks present in the 
operation of the firm and because of a lack of perfect mana¬ 
gerial foresight. 
Decisions pertaining to either the sources or the uses 
-4- 
of funds must be consistent with the objectives of the firm. 
Helfert symbolizes the interdependency of these decisions 
2 
in Figure 2. The base of the triangular relationship shows 
the balance necessary between uses and sources of funds, 
while the top of the relationship shows that these decisions 
must be in line with the specific objectives of the firm. 
For example, the decision to Invest in a new plant must be 
congruent with the objectives of the firm and the sources 
of funds available to the firm. Likewise, the decision as 
to which sources of funds to tap will depend on the use to 
which the funds are to be put and the objectives of the firm. 
The use of short-term funds to increase the asset base of 
the firm, for example, may be inconsistent with a sub-goal 
of liquidity of current position. 
All of the decisions must be made with respect to the 
specific risks, technological, competitive, or managerial, 
involved. Thus, the triangular relationship is set around 
the concept of risk. Further, management must reach a deci¬ 
sion on the basis of the information it is physically and 
economically able to collect and analyze. Further, manage¬ 
ment is capable of assimilating only a certain amount of 
information pertaining to a decision and this managerial 
limit represents a constraint on that decision. 
Uncertainty about future events is the over-all framework 
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within which management la forced to perform. It Is a 
constraint not only on the decision as to sources and uses 
of funds, but also on the administrative framework and 
managerial ability. 
The dynamic nature of the business enterprise adds a 
complicating factor to the decision framework. Since fu¬ 
ture movements of consumer demands, price structures, com¬ 
petitive conditions and governmental influence can be 
estimated with any degree of accuracy for only a relative¬ 
ly short period, financial management is faced with a con¬ 
stantly changing time horison. Decisions made currently 
with respect to future actions must constantly be modified 
to encompass changes in the elements effecting the decision 
as the time horison changes. 
CAPITA! BUDGETUiQ 
Cap!till budgeting has been defined in many ways, but 
all of the definitions involve the idea of decisions relat¬ 
ing to the choice of sources of funds and the uses to which 
these funds should be employed. 
a...the economics of capital budgeting...is, the kind 
of thinking that is necessary to design and carry through 
a systematic program fir investing stockholders money* "3 
oital Budgeting 
60}^ pTl? 
3Joel Dean, Cs 
sity Press, 19 
(New fork: Columbia Univer 
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Capital budgeting is a many-sided activity 
that includes searching for new and more pro* 
fitable investment proposals, investigating 
engineering and marketing considerations to 
predict the consequences of accepting the in¬ 
vestment! and making economic analyses to deter* 
mine the profit-potential of each investment 
proposal.4 
• ••the capital budget,••sets forth tho plan for 
capital expenditures for a future period. The 
composition of the capital budget is determined 
not only by the physical requirement of the 
business but by the effects that proposed ex¬ 
penditures will have on financing.5 
The matching of funds uses and sources 
in line with the corporate objectives is gen¬ 
erally referred to ns capital budgeting.6 
These statements of the meaning of capital budgeting 
include decisions relating to short-term uses and sources 
of funds as well as long-run uses and sources of funds. 
Since budgeting for short periods of time Involves less 
uncertainty than budgeting for long periods of time, often 
capital budgeting is limited to the narrower concept of 
long range planning of sources and uses of funds, treating 
•hort-run planning separately. Since the concepts and ideas 
in this paper concentrate on the problems associated with 
^Harold Bierman and Seymour Sraidt, yhe Capital Budgeting 
Decision (New York? The Macmillan Company, l9oOT, p. 3. 
^Helfert, op. clt.» p. 143- 
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capital expenditurea over a relatively long tine horizon, 
it will be useful to refer to capital budgeting in terms 
of the long range decisions. 
Dean breaks the problems of capital budgeting into 
four aspects:7 (l) the demand for capital funds, (2) the 
availability of capital funds, (3) the rationing of capital 
funds, and (4) the timing of expenditures* Although all 
of these aspects are extremely important to correct capital 
budgeting practices, the first three have received a great 
deal of treatment in the professional literature* The 
fourth aspect, the timing of expenditures, has received 
considerably less treatment. 
OBJECTIVE OF STUDY 
The objective of this study is to explore the concept 
of postponement as it relates to capital budgeting decisions* 
Postponement is defined as the decision to defer acceptance 
of an investment project until a later date* Traditional 
capital budgeting theory provides the basis for this study 
but oust be expanded in light of new discussions to allow 
Inclusion of the postponement concept as it is developed in 
Section III. These new discussions will be included in the 
review of traditional capital budgeting theory presented in 
7Dean, op. clt.* p. 6. 
Sections I and U. The review of traditional and current 
theory ie net meant to be exhaustive. Rather, the p&per 
will present the portion of theory that the author feels 
is germane to the development of the postponement concept. 
It is the hypothesis of this study that the decision 
to postpone investment projects, as distinct from the 
decision to accept or reject those projects, will, under 
certain circumstances, allow the firm to fulfill its finan¬ 
cial objectives to a greater extent then is provided by 
traditional capital budgeting theory. 
Since all of the following discussion will be couched 
in terms of the financial objectives of the firm, it is 
necessary at this point to develop these objectives. 
OBJECTIVES OF THE FIRM 
The establishment of long-run financial objectives 
for the firm is generally agreed to be a necessary premise 
for discussions of capital budgeting theory and technique.* 
The broad objective most often cited is profit maximisation 
oven though there is an increasing amount of dissent on 
this point. In Chapter One of his book, 
mics. Dean discusses profit-maximisation as a long-run goal 
for the firm. He dispels the dissent on this point in the 
following paragraph: 
-9- 
A business firm is an organisation designed 
to make profits, and profits are the primary 
measure of its success. Social criteria of busi¬ 
ness performance usually relate to quality of 
products, rate of progress, and behavior of 
prices. But these are tests of the desirability 
of the whole profit system. Within that system, 
profits are the acid test of the individual 
firm’s performance.9 
Solomon also supports this position: 
The over-all business objective which has 
been put forward most frequently for purposes 
of theoretical analysis i3 that of profit-max¬ 
imisation. This is the goal which is still 
assumed within the main corpus of economics .^0 
He continues by analyzing the dissent to profit maximiza¬ 
tion as a long-run goal. He concludes that a concept of 
wealth maximization based on maximizing the net present 
worth of the firm is the most rational operating criterion 
for financial management. 
The gross present worth of a course of ac¬ 
tion is equal to the capitalized value of the flow 
of future expected benefits, discounted (or capi¬ 
talized) at a rate which reflects their certainty 
or uncertainty. Wealth or net present worth is 
the difference between gross present worth and 
the amount of capital investment required to achieve 
the benefits being discussed. Any financial action 
which creates", wealth or which has a net present 
worth above zero is a desirable one and should be 
undertaken. Any financial action which does not 
meet this test should be rejected. If two or more 
desirable courses of action are mutually exclusive 
(i.e., If orily one can be undertaken), then the 
9Joel Dean, Managerial Economics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1959), p. 3* 
l°Solomon, op. clt.. p. 15* 
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decision should be to do that which created 
most wealth or shows the greatest amount of 
net present worth* In short* the operating 
objective for financial management is. to 
maximise wealth or net present worth.31 
Other theoreticians have put forth goals which* al¬ 
though based on profit maximisation, differ with respect 
to the exact nature of the function to be maximised. 
Gordon and Shapiro express the goal in terms of max¬ 
imising the value of stockholders1 equity: 
We state that the objective of a firm 
is the maximisation of the value of the 
stockholders1 equity. While there may be 
legitimate differences of opinion as to 
whether this is the sole motivation of man¬ 
agement* we certainly feel that there can be 
no quarrel with the statement that it is a 
dominant variable in management's decisions.12 
Luts and Luts express the goal in terms of maximising 
the rate of return on investors' owned capital.*3 
T. Scltovsky sets maximisation of profit par unit of 
capital invested* based on an internal rate of return on 
a firm's present capital funds, as the relevant financial 
UIbid., p. 20. 
13k. J* Gordon and Ell Shapiro* ’Capital Equipment Analysis: 
The Required Kate of Profit* October, 
1956, ft .Tfrf f^Coi^ratA CapXtq£i ed. Kara 
Solomon (Graduate School of Business, The University of 
Chicago, 1961), p. 142. 
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goal.^ 
Modigliani and Killer attempt to bridge these differ¬ 
ences by stating that, under certainty, maximisation of 
profits and maximisation of market value are equivalent. 
With the Inclusion of uncertainty, however, the goal of 
profit maximisation breaks into an undeflnable and unusable 
concept. 
Under uncertainty there corresponds to 
each decision of the fins not a unique profit 
outcome, but a plurality of smt/u/ally exclu¬ 
sive outcomes which can at best be described 
by a subjective probability distribution* The 
profit outcome, in short, has become a random 
variable and as such its maximisation no longer 
has an operational meaning.15 
The goal of market value maximisation, however, does 
provide an operating objective under uncertainty. The 
market price will account for risks assumed in the firm1* 
projects, risks involved with the capital structure main¬ 
tained, growth potential, and earnings* payments made, for 
not only are the present owners considered but also pros¬ 
pective owners. If current owners disagree with management 
and the market overvaluation of the firm, they are free 
to sell and invest elsewhere, but they will still benefit 
from capital appreciation resulting from management deci¬ 
sions * 
Scltovsky, Welfare and Competition (Homewood, Illinois: 
Richard D. Irwin, 19$!J,pT 2087 
15?. Modigliani and M. H. Miller, "The Coat of Capital, 
Corporation Finance, and The Theory of Investment," The 
American Economic Review. June, 195*, in The Management, 
ed. Solomon, op. olt., p. 152. 
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This coal of market value maximisation la concurrent 
conceptually with Solomon's (see footnote 10 of this Sec¬ 
tion) goal of wealth maximization. Both are aimed at 
maximising the wealth of the owners. Both measure wealth 
in terms of owner benefit. In Solomon's concept, the net 
present worth of the firm actually is owned by the stock¬ 
holders and, therefore, increasing the net present worth 
will increase the owners' wealth. Although he doesn't 
state that wealth is measurable in terms of market value, 
the valuation of a stock by the market is based partially 
on the expected flow of earnings (or wealth in Solomon's 
terms) and thus the two concepts are basically equivalent. 
Cheng and Shelton carry this idea one step further: 
In the truest sense this (stockholders' 
wealth, editor's note) means the sum of mar¬ 
ket value plus dividends received; in practice 
a firm has, at best, limited control over mar¬ 
ket behavior, so the firm may accept as its 
proximate goal the maximisation of earnings 
per share. If, for simplification, we assume 
the price earnings ratio is constant so long 
as the capital structure proportions are un¬ 
changed, maxi ailing earnings per share and 
maximizing narket value are identical goals. 
For purposes of this paper we can assume that the 
financial 30a! of the fini is to maximise the v/ealth of 
the stockholders. Wealth is defined as the market price 
of the ownership chare and Is directly affected by the 
*6pao L. Cheng and John P. Shelton, "A Contribution to 
the Theory of Capital Budgeting1 (Unpublished papers. The 
University of Massachusetts, The Graduate School of Busi¬ 
ness Administration, made available by), p. 2. 
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earnings per share of the Stock. If the price-earning* 
ratio is constant, the maximisation of earnings per ahare 
will maximize the wealth of the stockholder sincem increase 
in earnings per share will increase the market price* For 
example, if the price-earnings ratio is constant at 10 
and the market price of the ownership share is $100, then 
earnings per share are $10* If the earnings per ahare are 
increased to $13 and the price-earnings ratio remains con¬ 
stant at 10 (which implies the degree of stockholder risk 
is constant), the new market price would be $130* 
SECTION I 
DEMAND FOR FUNDS 
In the introduction the triangular relationship be¬ 
tween uses of funds, sources of funds, and corporate ob¬ 
ject ires was presented. It was pointed out that these are 
actually Mutually determined factors and decisions relat¬ 
ing to them cannot be cade in isolation. However, for 
our purposes it is useful to discuss independently each 
of the factors in order to elucidate the capital rationing 
problems encountered by the firm and the solution techni¬ 
ques suggested by capital budgeting theory. 
Management has always been faced with the problem of 
rationing the funds available to the firm among various 
investment opportunities considered by the firm. The list 
of investment opportunities represents the firm's demand 
schedule for funds. The Inherent question is: how should 
a firm determine whether or not to invest in a particular 
project? Until quite recently the only answer available 
was to invest as long as the return promised by the project 
was greater than the cost of the project. This approach 
Involved several problems for the financial manager. How 
can the return on a project be measured in the face of fu¬ 
ture uncertainties? How can the costs of capital acquisi¬ 
tion be determined since both debt and equity funds are pre¬ 
sent in the capital structure? 
-15- 
With no direct answers for those questions a "rule 
of thumb would often be adopted by management. One of 
these was to relate the dollar return fro* a project to 
the original investment outlay to determine the number of 
years required for the project to pay for itself. This 
'’payback period ’ rule night be stated: accept only those 
projects which provide a return sufficient to pay for them¬ 
selves in five years or less." In studying the capital 
budgeting techniques of 4# companies, Istvan found that 34 
of them employed the payback period’r as a measure of ac¬ 
ceptability.^ The rationale for this approach seems to be 
that management can forecast accurately only five years into 
the future, and being very uncertain about flows after that 
time, it chooses to assume that they are zero. Thus the 
"payback period' method is a pessimistic approach and may 
well pass up projects that are, in fact, quite favorable. 
Variations on this same theme have been suggested and 
used from time to time. Istvan found that 32 companies em¬ 
ployed a nontime adjusted rate of return as a decision cri¬ 
terion.2 This criterion measures the rate of return as the 
ratio between average yearly receipt and original investment 
outlay expressed as a percentage. The company would set s 
Leeisions. Indiana 
BuslaM* Report *o. 33 (Bur.a» or Buainaaa R...arch, Grad- 
uate School of Business, Indiana University, 19&1), P* 91* 
-Dowld 7. Iatwa, r^jta^Expfndltpr^^ Hapearch, Grad- 
2lbld.. p. «5. 
-16- 
"cut-off rate" as soma percentage return, say 10 percent. 
Projects exhibiting greater returns would be accepted and 
those exhibiting smaller returns rejected. There is con¬ 
siderable difference between companies with respect to the 
measurement of the average yearly receipt. Some companies 
use pre-tax flows; others use after-tax flows; some compan- 
t 
lea add back depreciation, end so forth. 
Hegardless of the method of computation employed, sim¬ 
ple rate of return "rules of thumb” may lead to incorrect 
capital rationing for at least two reasons. For one, the 
payback period, or simple rate of return chosen as the pro¬ 
per cut-off point is purely arbitrary and may not reflect 
accurately the capital cost conditions faced by the firm. 
More importantly, it is assumed that all receipts are 
equally valuable. That is, it is assumed that a dollar 
received today is worth as much as a dollar received In the 
future. But this is an inaccurate assumption because a 
dollar received today can be lent out by a firm and earn 
interest and thus it has more value to the firm than a dol¬ 
lar received in the future. Further, the dollar expected 
in the future may not materialize and thus the firm should 
place more value on returns currently expected than those 
expected in the future. 
Any decision relating to the demand for capital must 
consider these factors or fall to the same errors* 
-17- 
The problem can be broken Into two parte* First, the 
decision relating to the acceptance of one project can be 
developed and then the decision relating to acceptance of 
a number of projects can be analysed. This differentiation 
is necessary because the techniques suggested in the profes¬ 
sional literature for acceptance or rejection when one pro¬ 
ject is being considered have been shown to be inadequate 
when more than one project is being considered.3 
SINGLE PROJECT CASE 
The sub-goal that motivates financial management was 
assumed in the introduction to be the maximisation of the 
market price of the equity ownership share. If only one 
project is being considered, this can be accomplished either 
by accepting a project if the internal rate of return (see 
footnote & of this Section) expected from the project ex¬ 
ceeds the cost of obtaining the funds necessary to finance 
it or if the net present value of the project when discount¬ 
ed to the present at a rate equal to the cost of capital is 
positive. The capital cost cannot be considered at the mar¬ 
gin; that in, we could not say that the cost of capital is 
equal to the interest cost of debt if debt funds were obtain¬ 
ed to finance the project. The cost of capital is determined 
3cheng and Shelton, op. clt 
-18- 
by the over-nil capital structure, for as debt is Increased, 
investors may capitalise earnings at a lower rate and thus 
decrease the market price of equity. This would tend to in¬ 
crease the cost of raising additional equity funds and would 
therefore raise the over-all cost of capital* These rela¬ 
tionships will be explored in greater detail In Section II. 
It is sufficient at this point to note that the cost of capi¬ 
tal is based on the over-all capital structure and not the 
margins1 cost of additional funds. If the return expected 
from a project exceeds the over-all cost of obtaining funds, 
the project will increase the a&rleet price of equity and 
would therefore be accepted. 
The budgeting problem, then, rests partially on the 
determination of the expected return. If we know the outlay 
required for a project and the estimated stream of returns 
from the project, there is little difficulty in determining 
the rate of return. However, these expected returns must 
be adjusted to reflect both the futurity of the receipts 
and the uncertainty ©f the receipts.^ These receipts will 
be measured after taxes plus depreciation since they repre¬ 
sent net cash generations. This net cash generation is the 
basis for our computing a rate of return. We use the after¬ 
tax generation because the tax effect can be very important 
^Lindsay, Robert, and S&met*, Arnold V., Financial Manage¬ 
ment: An Analytical Approach (Homewood, Ullnola; Richard 
D. Irwin, Inc., 1963), chap. 111. 
-19- 
*t a 52 percent marginal rata and taxes are ever present. 
Depreciation acta aa a tax shield and must be added back 
to accurately show true not cash gains fro* a project.^ 
Without considering futurity of receipts, or risk, 
we could say that a machine costing $1,000 that returned 
total cash generations of $1,100 with no salvage value would 
exhibit a 10 percent return. But since these returns are 
obtained in the future, they must be discounted to compare 
the* with the present investment outlay in order to compute 
a rate of return. The net cash generation is discounted 
first to reflect futurity and secondly to reflect the risk 
of not receiving the forecasted return. 
In order to simplify the analysis, several assumptions 
may be made. The Investment outlay is assumed to be made 
at one point in time. Further, the cash receipts are assumed 
to be level for a certain number of years. Finally, the pro¬ 
ject is assumed to have no scrap value at the end of the per¬ 
iod. The discussion would be unchanged if these assumptions 
were lifted, but the computation would be somewhat more com¬ 
plex. Therefore, the inclusion of these assumptions will 
allow a more concentrated discussion without losing any 
relevance. 
As an example, suppose that a $1,000 lnveststent would 
^John G. Kemeny, Arthur Schleifer, Jr., J. Laurie Snell, end 
Gerald L. Thompson, Pinlte_ Mathematics with,Businf#s Appli¬ 
cations (Englewood Cliffs, H.J.:Prentice-Hall, Inc., 19&2), 
discuss this concept on pages 334-3$* 
-20- 
return $200 per year tor 10 years and would then be worth¬ 
less . Since the cash generated by the project is recetved 
during future time periods, we could not say that the total 
10 year receipt would be worth $2,000 to the firm today. 
When the $200 is received at the end of the first year , it 
is worth less than $200 to the firm today since, if it had 
been received at the first of the year, it could have beeu 
invested in a no risk loan and earned Interest during the 
year. Thus, we must discount the cash generation by the 
rate that could have been earned to reflect the present 
value of the future receipt* The concept of present value 
is well established in the professional literature and con¬ 
venient tables are available that give present value factors 
for various discount rates and various tine intervals* 4 This 
paper deals with annual compounding since the receipts are 
realized at the end of each year* Comprehensive tables 
are available for semi-annual, quarterly, monthly, and con¬ 
tinuous compounding but are not necessary for this analysis* 
If ws assumed that a six percent riskless rate could 
be earned by the firm, the present value of the first year1 a 
receipt would be $200 x *943 * $183.60. Compounding annually, 
the receipt of $200 per year for 10 years discounted at six 
percent would have a present value of $200 x 7*360 • 
^Thls paper will employ the present value tables found in 
Robert If* Anthony, ft&nr.gempnt Accounting (Homewood, Illi¬ 
nois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., I960). 
-21- 
n 
$1,472* Thus, tht total rscslpts over the 10 year period 
have been discounted to reflect the futurity of the cash 
flows from $2,000 to $1,472. Time, the investment that had 
shov;n an annual return of 2C percent ($200/$l,000) has been 
reduced to show an annual return of about 15 percent 
($147.20/$1,000).* 
This 15 percent annual return, however, is for an 
assured yearly net cash generation of $200. Since the firm 
is not certain of receiving $200, especially in the later 
yearn, the expected return will be less than 15 percent to 
reflect uncertainty* Lindsay and Samets suggest two po3sibls 
^Mathematically, this would be! 
200 
r'jos 
+ , 200 + 200 ^ 
Tl-TSST2 TTttP 
$1,472 
or, following standard notation such && found in Keraeny, 
Sehleifer, Snell and Thompson, op, clt.» p. 320: 
200 
(l.Of )10 - 
ToTfiTonTP - $1,427 
°Another \rx7 of obtaining the discounted rate of return 
is to find the discount rate r that equates the present 
value of the cash throw-off flow to the present investment 
outlay. This is known ae the internal rate of return. 
This method assumes that cash generated by the investment 
will be reinvested at the discount rate r. Our example 
assumes that the cash throw-off will be reinvested at six 
percent and therefore some variation between the rates ob¬ 
tained will be observed. 
The internal rate of return shown is about 15 percent. 
$1,000 i- 200 
TFrT2 
. • • . gCO whom r ^ 15? 
TFrP^ 
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means of accounting for uncertainty.^ The firm could de- 
croaso its aatimato of expected yearly net each generation, 
or it could increase the discount rate for futurity. 
In the first case it is assumed that the management 
of the fine will hare some idea of possible cash receipts 
and could express these possible outcomes in terms of a 
probability distribution. The algebraic sum of this distri¬ 
bution (that is, the sum of the possible cash generations 
times the respective probabilities of realising those gen¬ 
erations) would provide the expected value of the yearly 
cash generation. If the variance of the yearly distribu¬ 
tions were a constant function of time (that is, the variance 
of the tenth year is 10 times the variance of the first year), 
one probability distribution could be expressed for the re¬ 
ceipt of a certain amount per year for 10 years, and thus 
the expected yearly cash generation could be obtained. If 
the probability distributions could be computed very accur¬ 
ately, a standard deviation could be used to measure the 
dlspersln of the distribution. This process, however, is 
not practical since the probability distributions are not 
generally accurate enough to provide a useful basis for 
elaborate variance analysis. Further, as the variance in¬ 
creases, the expected value shown becomes less meaningful. 
Therefore, management will decrease the anticipated cash 
^Lindsay and Samets, op. Pit.. chap. ill. 
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generation by soma amount x in an attempt to reflect uncer¬ 
tainty and increase variability of future recepts Instead 
of attempting to ascertain the expected value of the cash 
generation* 
If, in our example, management decided to decrease 
projected receipts by 20 percent to allow for uncertainty, 
our expected yearly cash throw-off would be $160.10 Using 
the discounting technique outlined above, the present value 
of the expected flow at six percent discount would be 
$160 x 7*3^0 « $1,177*60 or an annual rate of return of 
about 12 percent ($117*70/$l,QQO).^* This 12 percent In¬ 
cludes consideration of both futurity and risk and is lower 
than the 15 percent return observed when only futurity of 
receipts was considered. 
The second method suggested by Lindsay and Samsts to 
reflect uncertainty is to increase the rate used to discount 
for futurity. Instead of using a six percent futurity dis¬ 
count rate, the firm would increase this rate to 10 percent. 
(Four percent would be added for uncertainty since $200 per 
year was a 20 percent return and $160 is a 16 percent re¬ 
turn. ) This Is saying that the firm would equate a $200 
uncertain yearly cash throw-off to a $160 certain yearly 
10 $200 - (.20 x 200) « $160 
lousing the internal rate of return method outlined in 
footnote 6 of this Section, the internal rate of return is 
about 10 percent. The difference is due to the reinvest¬ 
ment assumption expressed in footnote 6. 
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cash throw-off. Tho expected annual rate of rat urn on the 
project becomes 12 pareAnt ($200 x 6.145 - $1,229 and 
$122/$1,00C - 12 pareant). Thus, the result in both caaaa 
la approximately the anise. 
It la easy to aaa that the larger the discount for 
uncertainty, the smaller the expected annual rate of return. 
Since our decision criterion for the single project case la 
to accept the project if the rate of return la greater than 
the over-all capital cost, the discount rate for uncertainty 
will affect rejection or postponement of projects. This 
aspect will be discussed in greater detail In Section III. 
MULTI-PROJECT CASE 
Thus far only the case of a single Investment project 
has been analysed. Most writers In the field conclude that 
the decision rule outlined above Is valid for the multi- 
project case as well as the single project case. A few state¬ 
ments of this position are presented. The list Is not ex¬ 
haustive by any means, but it does reflect current thinking 
on this point. 
Joel Dean states, "...this cut-off rate of return Is 
automatically determined by the Intersection of the demand 
and supply curves. Thus, how much to Invest and what the 
cut-off rate should be are two sides of the same coin. ”12 
12j)#4nf op. clt.. p. 63. 
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In his discussion the ’demand curve" is a list of potential 
investments ranked in order of their profitability. The 
'supply curve" is the schedule of costs of capital for 
increasing amounts of funds. Thus, by employing the in* 
tersection of these two curves as the proper rejection 
point. Dean is saying that the coat of capital is the cut- 
off rate of return for both single and multi-project cases. 
Solomon, in his article, Measuring a Company's Cost 
of Capital,*13 describes the process of capital rationing 
In three steps. First, each proposal should be ranked by 
the rate of return it promises. Then, the cost of each 
available source of funds is computed and arrayed In as¬ 
cending order of cost. Finally, 
A comparison of these two schedules 
provides an explicit and correct solution 
to the capital-budgeting problem. Succes¬ 
sive proposals should be accepted from 
within the descending array as long as the 
prospective yield from each is higher than 
the cost of obtaining the increment of funds 
required for its financing.*e 
In a currently unpublished paper, Cheng and Shelton 
assail this idea when more than one proposal is being con¬ 
sidered. 
Despite the fact that the cost of 
capital Is the proper hurdle rate for one 





, p. 12S-41* 
linesa, The 
_ ed. Esra Solomon 
versity of Chicago, 
128. 
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investment decision considered by Itself, 
It is imprecise to apply the cost of capital 
as a cut-off point for determining which pro¬ 
jects to accept and which to reject when the 
firm has more than on© investment opportunity 
under consideration#15 
this disagreement as to the proper cut-off point is 
highly important to the development of the postponement con¬ 
cept since a higher minimum rate will residually involve 
rejection or postponement of some projects that would have 
been implemented had a lower rate (the cost of capital) 
been used# 
Cheng and 3helton continue their hypothesis: "It 
is clear that anyone who confines the use of the cost of 
capital in capital budgeting to a single investment project 
is being theoretically precise 
There has been no warning, unfortunately, 
th&t the same principal which applies to a single 
project cannot be used where several projects 
have been ranked# In fact many authors when 
writing about capital budgeting have explicitly 
stated that the use of cost of capital, as a 
hurdle rate for many projects, was a valid in¬ 
ference from the fact that it will work for one 
project* Our point la simply this: for most 
firms capital budgeting involves consideration 
of more than one project and, therefore, for 
these firms the advise of using the cost of capi¬ 
tal as a hurdle rate for determining which projects 
to accept and which to reject is not valid .1/ 
^5cheng and Shelton, op, -CjL£»» p. 4. 
16Ibi4., p. a. 
17XfeM.. p- 9. 
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They continue with mathematical end graphical proof 
of their hypothesis and the reader is directed to their 
work rather than a summary here for the evidence presented. 
The importance of their work to this paper is the decieion 
rule cited by them# They say: 
The firm will always increase earnings 
per share If the percentage Increase in proflta 
from any Investment project exceeds the percent¬ 
age increase in capital required to finance that 
project# Thus, If some projects which come close 
to the coat of capital hurdle rate require a 
great deal of incremental investment, it may 
turn out that their percentage contribution to 
profits (including the profits from more lucra¬ 
tive projected investments) is smaller than 
their proportionate Increase in capital required 
and, therefore, earnings per share will be maxim¬ 
ised by rejecting these investments even though 
they promise a return which exceeds the cost of 
capital#1$ 
The optimum hurdle rate is higher than the 
coat of capital by an amount which depends on 
each investment ladder* This is because addi¬ 
tional projects require additional capital, and 
even for some projects that will yield more than 
the cost of capital the percentage increase in 
profitability they generate — considering the 
profit the firm would have attained as it moved 
down the ladder of returns — is less than the 
percentage increase in equity capital required#^ 
An example will serve to clarify this decision rule. 
Assume a firm has earnings of $50,000 per year and a capi¬ 
tal structure composed of 50,000 shares of common stock at 
a market value of $10 per share# Further, the cost of 
16mA-, p. 12. 
l?B>Ai», p. 22. 
capital la 10 percent. The present earnings per share is 
$1.00. The firm's management Is considering the following 
investment projects. 
’ * f » ! 
<■, " 1 
. / • 
project 









■ .V / i 
» # » * * 
^ A $35,000 $10,000 10 yrse 255? 
B 60,000 13,333 20 yrs. 225? 
C 40,000 8,333 10 yrs. 16?? 
D 
4 
60,000 7,100 20 yrs. 10?? 
E 50,000 5,500 
.risk adjusted as described earlier 
15 yrs. 755 
This example assumes, as do Cheng and Shelton, that 
new capital is obtained from the sale of common stock.20 
If the cost of capital were used as the cut-off rate, 
projects A through D would be accepted and project E would 
be rejected. 
- i 
Using the Cheng and Shelton decision rule, the choice 
would be made as follows: 
20Xf debt funds are employed, it is assumed that the same 
proportion of debt ahd equity will be maintained in the 
new capital structure as was present in the previous capi¬ 
tal structure. ftWe assumed new projects would be finc.noso. 
in the same proportion of debt and equity as the firm cur¬ 
rently has. This could be Justified as assuming the firm 
has found the capital structure proportions that optimize 
or 1satisfice* for it and does not want to change this 
ratio• " Cheng and Shelton, op. cit.. p. 19# 
-29- 
EToJect /5 increase 
in warnings 
% increase in 
caj2ital„re_«iai£fii 
decision 
A 20 7 accept 
B 22 11 accept 
C 11 6 accept 
0 9.5 reject 
E 6 7.2 reject 
In this case projects D and Z would be rejected, while, 
under the conventional cost of capital rule, project D 
would ha*e been accepted- 
U? 1 « 
A look at the earnings per share will serve to demon¬ 
strate that the Cheng and Shelton rule is ifelid where the cost 
of capital rule will serve to actually decrease the wealth 
ie owners 







This schedule shows that the inclusion of project D, 
2lHere the assumption of a constant price earnings ratio 
is made in order to simplify the discussion. This Is 
logical, for as long as the debt-equity ratio remains 
constant, investors will capitalise earnings at the same 
rate. 
as tht cost of capital rule showed, actually decreases the 
earnings per share from $1*29 to $1.2$ and thus suboptimises 
the goal of the firm. 
It is important to note that the Cheng and Shelton 
decision rule rests on a lag between the time one project 
is initiated and the time funds are secured for the next 
project, long enough for the market price of equity to in¬ 
crease due to the earnings exhibited by the first project. 
This lag enables the firm to secure funds for the second 
project at the new higher equity market price* This, in 
ay opinion, is a drawback to their argument since this time 
lag will not always be present, but 1 feel that approaching 
the multi-project ease in terms of proportionate increases 
in earnings relating to proportionate increases in capital 
required is more valid than applying the single project 
rule of cost of capital as a cut-off rate to the multi- 
project case* 
The concept of cqltal cost is important nonetheless, 
for the single project caee employs this as the cut-off rate 
and Increasing the cut-off rate will tmd to postpone or re¬ 
ject projects that otherwiss would have been accepted* Also 
I have found discrepancy between the coat of capital deci¬ 
sion rule and the Cheng and Shelton hypothesis only for pro¬ 
jects exhibiting a rata of ratum close to the cost of capi¬ 
tal* Aa Lindsay and Samsts use the term ’cost of capital,'’ 
the Cheng and Shelton hypothesis and the singla projact 
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case decision rule arc the same.22 This will be discussed 
in acre detail in Section II* An analysis of capital cost, 
then, is next in line* 
22Lindsay and Sasets, op* clt«» p# 157* 
SECTION II 
C03T OF CAPITAL 
Numerous books and journal articles in the field of 
capital budgeting hove discussed the concept of the cost 
of capital. For the purpose of this paper, a complete 
review is not in order. However, several of the leading 
books and articles in the field will be examined to show 
how the cost of capital affects postponement of investment 
projects A 
The term ‘’cost of capital i3 an unfortunate one be¬ 
cause it has been used in many different ways to imply 
different diclsion criteria. In the past the term was fre¬ 
quently used to denote costs of specific types of capital 
funds such as the coat of debt funds and the cost of equity 
funds. More recently, however, theoreticians generally 
agree that the real cost of funds is frequently different 
from the explicit cost. Durand?recognised this fact when 
he formulated the concept of "required rate" for investment 
proposals in opposition to the premise that the cut-off rate 
lln the introduction to his award winning doctoral disserta¬ 
tion Alexander Barges discusses the concept of the cost of 
capital and its relation to capital budgeting. Much of the 




hj-gffgcfr of Capital Structurs on th. Co,. ..of 
ewood Cliffs, H.J.: Prentic.-Hall, Inc., 196 
^David Durand, "The Cost of D«bt and Equity Funds for Busi 
n«ss," national Bureau of Economic R.a.arch, 1952, in Th. 
Management of Corporate Capital. edt Solomon, pp. dt., 
pp. $1-127. 
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should be the existing interest rate. His required rate 
was the rate of investment return which would offset the 
risks of the project and maintain the value per share of 
common stock. 
The required rate of earnings...is in a 
sense the cost to this corporation of borrow¬ 
ing the needed money. Of course, it is not 
an out-of-pocket cost, but a sort of opportun¬ 
ity cost — the minimum rate that the new in¬ 
vestment oust earn without being actually 
disadvantaseous to the stockholders.3 
This differentiation of real and apparent costs can 
be easily realised when the costs of debt funds and equity 
funds are viewed simultaneously. While the interest costs 
of debt funds are lower than expected equity costs, the 
additional risk of Increased debt will be reflected in 
higher equity costs. The higher cost of equity funds should 
therefore be considered as an imputed cost of debt funds. 
Since the use of one source of funds can influence the cost 
of other sources of funds, the cost of capital is consider¬ 
ed to be some weighted average of the cost of each type of 
funds in the capital structure. 
The computation of cost of equity to use in arriving 
at this weighted average capital cost is a disputed topic. 
While most theoreticians believe that the cost of common 
stock capital is the expected rate of return required by 
investors, there is disagreement as to whether this return 
3Ibid.. pp. 95-96. 
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should be neasured In terras of dividends or In terras of 
earnings. On the one hand, J. B. Williams and Bleraan 
and Bmidt^ hold that dividends are the ultimate source of 
value for a stock and that the cost of equity funds should 
be measured by an expected dividend-price ratio. 
The cost of common stock capital is equal 
to the return required by coiimon a wockholders. 
This return can be measured by comparing expect- 
cd future dividends to the present market value 
of the common stock. The rate of discount that 
equates future dividends for perpetuity to the 
cost of the stock is the cost of capital for 
common stock capital.5 
The cost of retained earnings is also dividend asso¬ 
ciated. 
The cost of using retained earnings i£ therefore 
the nlnimura yield that raust be earned on addi¬ 
tional investments within the company in order 
that the additional investment will be as valu¬ 
able to the stockholder as a corresponding im¬ 
mediate increase in dividends 
On the other hand, Hunt and Williams, Spencer and 
Slegelnan, David Durand, Solomon, and others? hold that the 
4j, B. Williams. The Theory of Investment Value (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Tress, 193ff]| Bierman and Smidt, 
5Blerman and Smidt, on. cit., p. 135• 
6Ibid., p. 144, italicised in original text. 
7P. Hunt and C. M. Williams, Basic frajneas yinance (Ho^e- 
wood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc#, 1$56); K. H. ^pen- 
car and L. Siegelman, Managerial UconoalfiA (Hoaewood, Illi¬ 
nois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1959); Durand, op. 
Solomon, The Theory of Financial Management, op. ,ci&. See 
also Lindsay and Samets, op. cit. 
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expected future earnings are the source of value of a 
3tock and that the cost of equity should be measured by an 
expected oaroings-price ratio. They feel that earnings 
which are not paid out will enhance the future earnings of 
the company and therefore enhance the value of the stock. 
Investors should be indifferent as to whether their return 
comes from dividends or an increase in the value of the stock. 
...the only valid criterion for the cost of 
new equity capital is a refinement of the aim- 
. i j pie E/P ratio. Instead of E, the current earn¬ 
ings per share, the numerator should measure 
man^;ement ’$ best estimate of whet average 
future earnings would be if the proposed capi¬ 
tal expenditure were not k*ad«. Ife shall refer 
to this concqt as E*. Assuming that underwrit¬ 
ing and flotation costs are aero, the ratio 
E|/p is the best conceptual measure of the cost 
or new equity capital...^ 
huts and Luts$ suggested making a distinction between 
the borrowing rate (the rate at which funds can be obtained) 
and the lending rate (the rate which could be obtained out¬ 
side the firm in the loan market or through investments in 
other firms) in order to clarify the budgeting process with 
respect to the proper capital cost. They say: '’We assume 
that the entrepeneur discounts his own profits at an outslds 
lending rate which ia constant and is not Identical with the 
borrowing rate."10 The lending rate is constant (for any 
Solomon^ ’Measuring a Companyrs Coat of Capital, pp« eft., 
pp. 130—31• 
^huta and Lutz, on. clt. 
10M., p. 22. 
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level of investment) because they assume perfect competi¬ 
tion in the funds' market• Homerer, the borrowing rate 
"...is an increasing function of the amount he borrows 
solely on account of the increasing credit risk assumed 
by the lender The lending rate then becomes the cost 
of capital* It is the rate the firm could earn if it in- 
rested its funds outside the firm in commitments which de¬ 
monstrate risks comparable to the internal Investments 
proposed* The cost of capital would vary as the risk of 
the projects varies and the level of investment changes* 
Harry Roberts, in reviewing the concepts presented by 
Luts and Luts, arrives at a measure of lending rate (or 
cost of capital) as follows: 
•*«my proposal is that the lending rate should 
be measured by the expected rate of return on 
equity investments outside the firm that appear 
to the entrepreneur to involve a degree of riski¬ 
ness similar to those contemplated within the 
firm* 12 
These discussions of capital cost express the tradi¬ 
tional view that the cost of capital is a definitive concept 
and subject to rigid measurement* Lindsay and Samet*,1^ 
however, treat the subject in a different light. They 
feel that the cost of capital should be treated as an oppor¬ 
tunity cost that an investment project must cover in order 
nIbid.( p. 22. 
12h* V. Roberts, ’Current Problems in the Economies of 
Capital Budgeting,” Jmimal of Business, January, 1957, in 
The Management of Corporate Capital, ed* Solomon, ftp* c&&*, 
p* 200* 
Lindsay and Samets, op. cit* 
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to be profitable to the firm. It oust include a provision 
to cover additional risks encountered by the firm when a 
change in the capital structure is undertaken* 
The percentage coat of capital la the minimum 
required rate of return that the investment 
project must yield if it is to be "profitable* 
and hence to be adopted* Since profitability 
la defined in term of its effect on the stoek- 
holder t thia required rate la one that will at 
least net affect the price of the atock adverse¬ 
ly. That la, if an investment project le to be 
adopted, it must not depress the net expected 
returns per share with a constant price/retuma 
multiplier; or if the multiplier is adversely 
affected by the financing, the increased returns 
per share must be more than offsetting* In 
short, the coat of capital is an opportunity 
coat concept that sets the minimum rate that 
the investment must promise to return; at rates 
of return greater than the coat of capital at 
a rate, the price of the atock can be expected 
to rise.14 
The Cheng and Shelton hypothesis^ focuses on increas¬ 
ing the market price of common stock through increasing 
earnings per share (with a constant price-earnings ratio) 
more than the proportionate Increase in capital requires* 
Lindsay and Samets obtain the same end by increasing the 
cost of capital, as a cut-off rate, enough to insure an in¬ 
crease in market price of common due to increased earnings 
derived from an investment project* Note that the approach 
used by Lindsay and Samets is not restricted to a constant 
price-earnings ratio* If the price-earnings ratio declines, 
P* H2. 
153** Section X. 
that is, if investors capitalise earnings at a rate lower 
than the former rate due to increasing capital needs, the 
cut-off rate on investment projects is increased. Thus, 
the cost of capital is no longer a fixed and definitive 
rate hut instead is a flexible Investment tool used to as¬ 
sess Investment proposals. 
In computing the cost of capital Lindsay and Swats 
include a growth factor^ that will insure an increase in 
market price of common due to increased earnings derived 
from an investment project. The cost of new common stock 
is the ratio of the expected future earnings if the pro¬ 
jects under consideration were not undertaken (Ea) to the 
net proceeds from the sale of additional common stock 
(P A growth factor is included by an addition to 
the current eamings/market price relationship. rtThis Ea 
may he thought of as current E/P plus an anticipated annual 
rate of Increase in earnings... Thus, the cost of com¬ 
mon stock financing is determined by investor anticipation 
of expected future earnings, net proceeds from the new issue 
and a growth factor. 
*%he reader is directed to Ifaron Gordon, Ths_3&ve_ 
sartei Oharas? isrss* 
cuss ion of growth factors in common stock evaluation. 
ATthie approach is very similar to that presented by Solomon 
"Measuring a Company's Cost of Capital/' op. cit., p. 131* 
1 ^Lindsay and Samets, op. cit., p. 144# 
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They consider the imputed cost of retained earnings 
to bo basically tho same as tho cost of now equity. How¬ 
ever, there is a slight difference due to the fact that 
new equity flotation involves selling costs (that is, the 
net proceeds from the sale of common stock will be less 
than the market price) and therefore they conclude that 
”...a project financed by new shares requires higher pro¬ 
mised returns than that financed through plowback of earn¬ 
ings. "W 
In terms of continuous schedules the cost of 
finance will rise when internal sources are 
exhausted, but this is not the cutoff point 
unless the schedule of expected returns from 
investment falls below the next scheduled 
means of finance.••.*2® 
The determination of the cost of debt funds involves 
two considerations. When the outstanding debt is very small 
(that is, when the debt/equity ratio is very snail), the 
cost of new debt funds is the effective rate of interest 
contractually faced by the firm. However, as the debt/equity 
ratio increases beyond some point that leads stockholders 
to decrease the rate at which they capitalise earnings, 
the cost of debt will increase by an amount great enough 
19lbld.. p. 147* 
20ibld., p. 147-4$ • This brief susasary does not include 
the effect of taxation on the cost of funds. When the 
effects of taxation are incorporated into the discussion, 
the gap between the cost of new equity funds and tha coot 
of retained earnings is widened because tax off acta (and 
the capital gsins tax offset) tend to make new equity funds 
more expensive. 
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to offset the additional financial risk involved In the 
higher debt/equity ratio. 
This analysis of coat of capital assumes differing 
marginal capital cost rates and therefore a kinked supply 
curve for capital funds whose shape is determined by the 
type of additional funds employed, the present earnings/ 
price ratio, and the debt/equity ratio. Implicit in the 
analysis is that there is some optimum capital structure 
for each level of capital acquisition, and, further, that 
the required rate for budgeting analysis will not be con¬ 
stant but, rather, is subject to fluctuation depending on 
the type of capital employed. Projects which show a rate 
of return greater than the cost of capital at that level 
of capital acquisition will be accepted. The cost of capi¬ 
tal at that point will depend on the types of funds employ¬ 
ed in the capital structure. 
Professors Modigliani and Miller21 have presented an 
argument that runs counter to this proposition. They say 
that the capital structure has no effect on the cost of 
capital. They build their thesis on the idea that the total 
amount of risk associated with the net operating income of 
a firm is independent of financing since risk is a function 
ZlKodigllanl and Miller, on. cit«» PP- 150-dl. 
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only of the variability of the earnings stream and this 
variability is unaffected by the financial structure. 
r’...the average cost of capital to any firm is completely 
Independent of its capital structure and is equal to the 
capitalisation rate of a pure equity stream of its class."^2 
They then express the proper decision rule for capital 
expenditure programs: 
see 
will in_all eases be jjjeTPk la aef£nellta the 
expected rate of return on the common stock of 
an unlevered company in risk class k, editor’s 
note) suii vill be completely unaffected 
Equivalently, m may say that regardless of the 
financing used, the marginal cost of capital to 
a firm is equal to the average cost of capital, 
which is in turn equal to the capitalisation 
rate (p]£, editor’s note) for an unlevered steam 
in the class to which the firm belongs. 
Thus, in their terms, p^. is the relevant eost of e&plt&l 
and is the proper cut-off rate# They express in terms 
of an expected earnings to market/price ratio. f,...if pj 
denotes the (market, editor’s note) price and ij is the 
expected return per share of the jth firm in class k, we 




For purposes of analysis, Modigliani and Miller assumed 
^Ibld.. p. 156, italicised in original text. 
g3lbld.. P. 173* 
24lbld.. p. 155. 
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away the effect of taxes. Their argument rests on the 
fact that, as the firm attempts to engage temporarily 
cheap funds (debt funds), investors will consider the firm 
riskier than they did previously, which will upset the risk- 
safety balance of their portfolio. In order to restore 
this balance, investors will sell the Issuing corporation's 
equity shares and purchase the equity shares of another 
corporation in the same risk das a as the issuing corporation 
before the additional debt was encountered. This will de¬ 
press ths market price of equity for the Issuing corporation 
and thus the temporarily cheap debt funds will be made more 
expensive by the imputed increase in the cost of equity 
funds. Therefore, the cost of capital will bs the cost of 
squlty for any given level of capital acquisition regardless 
of the capital structure. 
In investigating this proposition, Barges2^ found that 
empirically the Modigliani and Miller thesis would hold 
only within certain limits where the firm was operating at 
a relatively high degree of leverage, that is, within cer¬ 
tain limits of a relatively low debt/equity ratio. For op¬ 
erations outside these narrow limits (debt/equity ratios 
either above or below), the proposition would not hold. 
♦Thus, on the basis of the evidence presented herein, the 
2?See Alexander Barges, op., cit. 
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hypothesis of Independence between average coat and capi¬ 
tal structure appears untenable.0^ 
David Durand27 attacks the proposition on the basis 
of the restrictive assumptions that Modigliani and Miller 
make in order to build their thesis. He particularly 
attacks the fact that the hypothesis will only hold under 
these unrealistic assumptions and that the authors were not 
able to approach reality. 
Starting with a perfect market in a perfect 
world, they have introduced small modifications 
in the direction of realism; but they have not 
made significant progress in this direction, 
considering their avowed aim of achieving an 
“operational definition of the cost of capital. ' 
Their treatment of risk affords, perhaps, the 
clearest example. In allowing corporate earn¬ 
ings to fluctuate somewhat — presumably around 
a fairly definite central value — MM /Modigliani 
and Miller/ have postulated a world that is not 
100 percent riskless; but it is a remarkably 
safe world -- being free from the risk of bond 
default, margin calls, foreclosures and major 
disasters of any sort.2# 
Lindsay and Samets also base their criticism on the 
need for rigorous assumptions. 
The principal objection to this theorem 
of "equal cost funds from all sources 1 is that 
it requires perfect markets for its execution. 
If there be lack of mobility of investorsr funds 
Zftlbld.. p. 103. 
27David Durand, "The Coat of Capital in an Impwfect Mar¬ 
ket: A Reply to Modigliani and Millar, " The American 
Economic Review, June, 1959, in IhS-.U*Sk£-cr":^H%- _of_Corp3£- 
£ic CrpitcJ, ed. Solomon, QE..C&., pp. 182-97. 
2&lbid.. p. 196. 
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between securities, and limits to their borrow* 
lag, psychological and institutional pressures 
toward debt securities, and legal restrictions 
on buying low-quality bonds or any stock, and 
in general lags and frictions in the capital 
markets ofwrious kinds, then the lower costs 
of particular types of finance could be seised 
upon by corporations at various times.29 
CONCLUSIONS 
In this Section emphasis was placed on insuring that 
the firm’s cost of capital, when used as a cut-off rate 
for budgeting decisions, would be high enough to reflect 
changes In the rate at which investors capitalise the 
firm’s earnings due to changes in the capital structure 
» ; «. 
and changes in the investiacnt schedule. The Lindsay and 
Satinets’a cost of capital was shown to be consistent with 
the Cheng and Shelton hypothesis for the multi-project case* 
The risk adjusted schedule showing demand for a firm’s 
funds was developed in Section I. In this Section the 
coat of capital was developed as a concept that must be 
considered in total at one time but which is subject to 
change at the margin due to the securing cf different types 
of funds. This, then, represents a supply schedule for a 
firm’s funds. 
As long as the cost of capital is always large enough 
to be consistent with the Cheng and Shelton hypothesis, 
^Lindsay and Samets, op. dt.» p. 1^2. 
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the general investment mile can be stated as the interseo- 
tion of the supply and demand schedules. This general 
rule provides the base upon which the discussion of post¬ 
ponement will be developed in Section III. 
SECTION III 
POSTPONEMENT 
In order to Include postponement in present capital 
budgeting theory as it was developed in Sections I and II, 
it is useful to deal with three eases involving the post¬ 
ponement concept. Case one will discuss the postponement 
of projects, which would have been initiated had present 
budgeting theory been followed, in order to raise the 
market price of common equity when a future market entry 
is anticipated. Case two treats the postponing of cur¬ 
rently desirable projects because of anticipated projects 
yielding higher returns. Case three discusses postponing 
projects that would currently be rejected in order to allow 
them to ripen into profitable investments. 
There may be other cases where postponement would be 
advantageous, but I choose to limit the discussion to these 
three cases. The rationale for this restriction is that I 
feel most of the situations where postponement would be ad¬ 
vantageous will be covered in the following discussions and 
those cases not covered would be subject to similar analysis. 
For example, any project that present budgeting theory would 
currently reject can be analysed by the technique explained 
in case three to determine if it might become attractive in 
the future. Likewise, the analysis presented in case one 
can be used to determine whether or not currently unaccept¬ 
able projects might become acceptable in the future if a 
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market entry is anticipated, and ao forth. 
Before entering the actual analysis, it ia necessary 
to clear up one factor. Up to this point, the paper has 
used the tens "investment project" to mean any program 
requiring an outlay of funds by the firm for expectation 
of receipts. This Included projects in which the firm had 
a choice as to implementation time as well as projects in 
which the firm had no choice as to implementation time. 
This is an inaccurate factor, however, and one that must 
be corrected. There are three main types of projects with 
which this paper will deal.^ These I will categorise as 
(1) necessary, (2) strategic, and (3) desirable projects. 
(1) necessary projects. In many cases a firm faces a 
situation of forced action. That is, an investment must be 
made before operations can continue. A machine shop, for 
example, might have a central power supply break down. Be¬ 
fore it can continue operations, it must either repair or 
replace the inoperative power supply. This represents an 
Investment that must be made before the firm is able to per¬ 
form the function of a machine shop. Thus, the investment 
is necessary and therefore nonpostponable• 
(2) Strategic projects. This refers to projects which 
allow the firm to qmrate profitably but are not a prerequi- 
*The reader may choose to find fault with the categories 
chosen, for they are meant only to clarify the point that 
only certain types of projects are post ponable and are not 
to be subject to rigorous proof. 
site for operations* If the machine shop example is used 
again, perhaps a particular tool which allowed the shop to 
manufacture a certain part profitably becomes inoperative* 
The firm is faced with the decision to repair or to replace* 
It would be possible for the part to be manufactured by some 
other means, but the cost of such a procedure would render 
such manufacture unprofitable* The decision to repair or 
replace2 is strategic for profitable operations* It is not 
necessary, however, since the firm Is free to manufacture 
unprofitably. Since profitable operations are a wise policy 
of the firm, postponement of such projects is seldom possible* 
(3) Desirable projects are those which the firm feels 
may allow more profitable (or more desirable) operations 
but which are neither strategic nor necessary, and thus they 
are postponable. Desirable projects are the major class of 
projects with which this paper is concerned. 
Of course, it is possible for desirable projects to 
become strategic or even necessary projects within the firm’s 
time horison, but nonetheless they are currently subject to 
postponement* If a desirable project does become strategic 
or necessary, it may no longer be strictly subject to the 
analysis presented below. The analysis will, however, be 
helpful since it will show the budgeter the extent of the 
project’s profitability. 
^Assume that the firm is contractually obligated to manufac¬ 
ture a certain number of the parts so that the decision co 
not manufacture is not possible* 
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CASE ORE - POSTPONEMENT IN ORDER TO LOWER 
CAPITAL COSTS 
In Section II it was pointad out that the cost of capi¬ 
tal funds will increase as the demand for capital funds in¬ 
creases* This, of course, assumes that the firm will always 
employ the least expensive funds first and then employ pro¬ 
gressively more expensive funds to meet capital demands. As 
long as some maximum debt/equity ratio is maintained, the 
marginal cost of debt funds will be the contractual cost. 
The critical dtbt>4quity ratio Is that relationship for which 
tha creditors demand no risk premium and for which the stock¬ 
holders would cot chcige the rate at which they capitalise 
earnings. That is, the possibility of Increased earnings 
through leverage just offsets the risk of fluctuations in 
earnings due to the fixed charge associated with debt finan¬ 
cing. The total cost of funds at that point will be the sum 
of the eost of acquiring tha necessary equity base plus the 
contractual cost of the dabt. If the debt/equity ratio ex¬ 
ceeds the critical relationship, the cost of debt funds 
will increase* Stockholders may dacraase the rate at which 
they capitalise earnings, which will Increase the cost of 
the debt by the imputed increase in equity cost, or creditors 
may demand a risk premium and thus increase the debt cost 
directly. 
The marginal cost of retained earnings, as was pointed 
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out in Station II, is the average current returns/market 
price of stock plus a growth factor If applicable. If 
tax effacta are not considered, the marginal cost of - new 
equity is more than the coat of retained earnings because 
of flotation charges** Therefore, the total cost of capital 
funds is a rising and kinked function of the amount of funds 
obtained. 
If a firm is considering anterlng the funds market in 
the near future in order to finance a lavel of daairable 
projects, it will be advantageous to the firm to postpone 
certdb presently desirable projects in order to increase 
earnings per share more than would have been possible if 
the presently desirable projects were currently initiated. 
For example, assume that a firm has currsntly invested 
in projects which have depleted the funds on hand plus those 
that were generated internally during the period. The firm 
still has investment opportunities that yield a risk adjust¬ 
ed (see Section I) internal rate of return higher than the 
cost of capital and sufficient to yield a percentage increase 
in capital (the Cheng and Sheldon hypothesis). If the firm 
ware to implement these projects at this time, it would hava 
to go into the market for additional funds. If the funds 
obtain! were equity funds and the projects were implemented, 
3 Personal Income tax tends to increase the cost of new com¬ 
mon stock, and thus the difference between the cost of new 
common stock and tha cost of retained earnings will be even 
greater. 
the tamings per share of the stockholders would increase, 
as was stated above, since the percentage increase in earn¬ 
ings would be greater than the percentage increase in capi¬ 
tal required* With n constant earnings*/price ratio, this 
would increase the market price of the stock. However, if 
the marginal projects were postponed until the funds re¬ 
quired to finanoe then could be generated internally, the 
adoption of the projects at that time would increase earn¬ 
ings per share a greater amount since the same earnings 
would be generated and would be spread over only the exist¬ 
ing shares outstanding. 
If wore profitable projects were then available to the 
firm, they could be financed through the aale of addition¬ 
al equity at a higher market price and thus result in less 
dilution in earnings per share. The price/earninga ratio 
also may increase during the period of postponement due to 
the possibility of eves higher earnings in future periods 
resulting from the new projects which exhibit returns great 
er than the postponed project. If this iaarease in price/ 
earnings ratio does materialise, it represents an added 
bonus to the firm* However, such an increase could not be 
assumed and therefore the analysis will proceed under the 
assumption of a constant price/earnings ratio. 
By postponement the firm lost the returns that would 
have been generated by the postponed project during the 
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postponement period. But this is an opportunity loss to 
the firm and would not affect the market price of equity.^ 
A numerical example will serve to elucidate the point 
made here. Assume a firm with a price/earnings ratio of 
10, current earnings of $1,000, and a capital structurs 
which includes 1,000 shares of common stock has invested 
all of its currently available funds in profitable projects. 
However, the firm still has a desirable project, project A, 
which 4.11 increase earnings by $110 per year, (an 11 per¬ 
cent increase in earnings} and which will coat $1,000 to 
Implement (a 10 percent increase in capital required). It 
also has a project, project B, which can be implemented 
next year which will Increase earnings $200 per year and 
cost $1,000. If the firm went into the market now and ob¬ 
tained the required $1,000 for project A by selling common 
stock (100 shares would be necessary at the $10 market 
price), earnings per share would rise from $1.00 per share 
to $1.01 per share. 
CURRFHY POSITION: 
Common stock outstanding: 1,000 shares 
Price/eaminga ratio: 10:1 
Current earnings: $1,000 per year 
^Assuming a constant price/earnings ratio, the market price 
of equity in the future would be lower if the project were 
not currently initiated than it would have been h<:ci the 
project been initiated. Tills factor is accounted for in 
the numerical example and, as is shown, does not alter tie 
advisability of poatponement. 
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Current earnings per share: $1.00 
Current market price of common: $10 per share 
IP PROJECT A IWPLEMESTED: 
Common stock outstanding: 1,100 shares 
(1,000 + 100 « 1,100 shares) 
New earnings: $1,110 ($1,000 * $110 - $1,110) 
/ 
New earnings per share: $1.01 ($1,110/1,100 « $1.01) 
The next year the firm would implement project B and 
earnings per share would increase to $1.09- 
Common stock outstanding: 1,199 shares 
(1,100 + 99 ** 1,199 shares, 99 shares of new common 
would be necessary for project B at the new market 
price of $10.10 per share) 
New earnings: $1,310 (($1,110 + $200 - $1,310) 
Hew earnings per share: $1.09 ($1,310/1,199 * $1.09)-* 
If, however, the firm postponed project K until the 
following year (note that project A was a profitable project 
the previous year) and financed it through earnings gener¬ 
ated during the year, earnings per share would rise to $1.11. 
IP PROJECT A IMPmtERTED THE FOLLOWING TEAR: 
New earnings: $1,110 ($1,000 + $110 - $1,110) 
Shares outstanding: 1,000 
New earnings per share: $1.11 
5Even if project B were financed from the earnings gener¬ 
ated during the year, the earnings per share would only rise 
to $1,310/1,100 » $1.19. It should be remembered, however, 
that the firm intended to go into the funds’ market in order 
to finance project B. 
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If the fins then eoee. into the market to finance prou 
ject B, the ear nlngs per share will increase to $1*20* 
BJew earnings: $1»310 ($1,110 4 $200 « $1,310) 
Shares outstanding: 1,090 (1,000 + 90 1,090, 90 
shares would be needed at the new market price of $11.10) 
Slew earnings per share: $1.20 ($1,310/1,090 ** $1.20) 
r 
Thus, postponing project A, when the firm anticipated 
entering the market the following year, lowered the cost of 
equity and enabled the firm to increase earnings per share. 
The question may be asked, what if the firm didn’t implement 
project A at all; that is, what if it were rejected or post¬ 
poned indefinitely? In that case the firm would have enter¬ 
ed the funis’ market the following year at the current mar¬ 
ket price of $10 per share. 100 shares would have been 
necessary to finance project B and the earnings per share 
would have increased to only il.09. 
Kev earnings; $1,200 ($1,000 4 $200 * $1,200$ 
Sumter of shares outstanding: 1,100 (1,000 4 100 • 1,100) 
Earninga per share: $1.09 ($1,200/1,100 * $1.09) 
The decision rule is: when a firm i3 anticipating a 
market entry in the future, it should postpone those pro¬ 
jects which would currently require market financing but 
which could be financed through funds’ generation over the 
postponement period, in order to increase the market price 
prior to the anticipated market entry. 
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CASE TWO - POSTPONEMENT DUE TO ANTICIPATION 
OF FUTURE PROJECTS YIELDING GREATER RETURNS 
At certain times a firm may have available a currant 
investment project which has an expected yield higher than 
the risk adjusted cost of capital (see Section H) which 
makes it a profitable investment. However, the firm also 
expects to have a project within its time horizon which 
exhibits an even higher rate of return for the same in¬ 
vestment outlay. If the assumption is made that the firm 
does not wish to go into the capital market during the 
time horizon in order to finance both projects,^ it must 
choose between accepting the current project and foregoing 
the greater returns promised by the future project or post¬ 
poning the current project, placing funds in a short term 
risk free Investment (such as four percent government bonds) 
and accepting the higher returns from the future project 
when it becomes available. The problem could alternately 
be stated by asking this question: how large must the 
expected returns from the future project be in order to 
make foregoing of the returns from the present project (due 
to postponing that project) profitable to the firm? Once 
this "break-even^ point for the returns from the two projects 
is determined, the firm would need only to determine the ex¬ 
pected return from the future projeet. If the expected 
^This is a reasonable situation since many firms rastrlct 
sources for investment funds to idemally generated funds 
for long periods of time. 
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retum Is larger than the ’break-even* return, the firm 
would be wise to reject the current project in favor of 
the future project. If the expected return from the future 
project is lees than the "break-even* return, the firm 
would accept the current project and reject the future 
project. Rejection in this situation is a fora of post¬ 
ponement because, as soon as the restriction to current 
funds is lifted, the rejected project may be initiated. 
As developed earlier, a present value technique may 
be adopted, but the major problem inherent in that techni¬ 
que is the choice of an appropriate discount rate. The 
choice of a discount rate ia very important since choosing 
a low rate of discount will make the future higher proceeds 
quite attractive and the choice of a high discount rate will 
mako the future higher proceeds less attractive. 
A further problem is evident depending on the assump¬ 
tion made with respect to reinvestment of funds generatod 
by the two projects. Should the firm assume funds will be 
reinvested at the rate of return exhibited by the projects7 
or should tho assumption be made that funds will be reinvest¬ 
ed at some company-wide average rate as is suggested by 
Baldwin?^ 
7Th±a is inherent in the calculation of an internal rate 
of return. See Section I. 
^Robert H. Baldwin, liow to Assess Investment Proposals, 
Harvard Business Review, May-dune, 1959* 
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It the anticipated project is such that Incremental 
Investment may be made which will yield the same rate of 
return, then the cash throw-off from the present proposal 
can be invested at this higher rate when the anticipated 
project is available* Thus, there are three possible re¬ 
investment assumptions* 
Another approach to the problem is to capitalise the 
value of the cash generations from the proposals to the 
firm’s time horison* The project exhibiting the greatest 
value at that point is the most beneficial to the firm* 
This approach allows for the Inclusion of all possible re¬ 
investment assumptions and also frees the analysis from the 
problems associated with choice of a proper present value 
discount rate. However, this approach errs in that tha 
firm must make decisions on ths basis of preasnt valus and 
not future value* Though a project exhibits ths greatsat 
capitalised value at some point in the future, it may not 
exhibit the greatest present value, for its returns may bs 
very large in future years and thus have comparatively leas 
present valus to the firm than lower earlier returns from 
another project* The capitalised value approach is valuable, 
however, in that it allows the inclusion of all possible 
reinvestment rate assumptions* For this reason it will be 
used in the discussion of assumptions one and two* The dis¬ 
cussion under assumption three will show that the correct 
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procedure la a combination of the present value approach 
and the capitalised value approach* 
The discussion can usefully be formulated in terms of 
an example* Assume that a firm has a time horizon of 10 
years* That is, it feels that ten years Is the longest 
period into the future that it can forecast expected re- 
, _ t 
turns with any degree of accuracy* After that time, the 
variance In the distribution of possible returns becomes 
so large that ft 5b impractical to expect any returns at all 
from the projects * Or, stated another way , the probability 
distributions will flatten out in the future to such an 
extent that they are rendered useless * The firm has a pro¬ 
ject currently available that will cost $1,000 and will 
enjoy an expected cash throw-off of $192 per year or four¬ 
teen percent *9 The research and development department 
has assured the firm that a project will be available in 
three years that will also cost $1,000 but will yield a 
greater caeh thxw-off • The firm also can invest in risk 
free government securities that will yield four percent 
per year* The question, then, is how large must the cash 
throw-off be from the second project in order for the firm 
to postpone the first project and invest in the second pro¬ 
ject three years from now? If the expected cash throw-off 
^Receipt of $192 per year for 10 years on a project costing 
$1,000 is an internal rate of return of 14 percent* 
-59- 
ls greater than the minimum required, tha firm will reject 
the first project and accept the second project in three 
years. Likewise, if the cash throw-off is less than the 
minimum required, the firm will accept tha first project. 
The minimum cash throw-off required in order for post¬ 
ponement to be advantageous will be colored by the reinvest 
ment rate assumed* Therefore, each reinvestment rate as¬ 
sumption will be treated individually. 
ASSUMPTION ONE 
The Cash Throw-off from Each Project 
Is Reinvested at the Internal Rate of 
Return Exhibited by That Project 
With the assumption that the cash throw-off from each 
project will be reinvested at the rate of return exhibited 
by the project, the problem is to find the minimum cash 
throw-off for project two that will equate the capitalized 
value of project one for 10 years at 14 percent to the cap! 
tallsed value of the cash throw-off from project two rein¬ 
vested at its rate of return, plus the Interest that would 
be obtained on the £1,000 invested for three years at four 
percent. 
Mathematically, the capitalized value of the stream of 
earnings from project one is: 
lOstandard notation as presented by Kemeny, Schlelfer, 
Snell and Thompson, op. clt.» p. 320. 
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The compound interest earned on $1,000 invested at 
four percent for three years is: 
$1,000 (l+.04)3 - 1,000 - $125 
The capitalised value of the stream of earnings for 
project two is: 
x - earnings per year from project two, y[t^q 
(Note that the earnings for project two will only be realised 
for seven years since the time horison is ten years and the 
project is to be implemented three years hence,) 
The minimum cash throw-off required of project two can 
be found by solving: 
for x and r, where r is both the reinvestment rate and the 
internal rate of return exhibited, fhe values that satisfy 
these conditions are where x « $273 and r “ 20 percent. 
Thus, project two must exhibit a cash throw-off of at 
least $273 per year if It is to be advantageous for the firm 
to postpone project one in favor of project two. This is 
easily shown* The decision rule would tell the firm that 
it should postpone project one in favor of project two if 
project two were to show an expected cash throw-off of, say, 
$300 per year, it the end of ten years project one would 
have a capitalised value of $3»713 as was shown above. If 
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project two had a cash throw-off of $300 per year for seven 
years (which is an internal rate of return of 26 percent), 
the c&pit&llaed value of Its cash throw-off plus the inter- 
eat earned on the $1,000 invested for three years at four 
percent would bet 
jjtycoO ic&oj +- ~ J ~ ^ 7oO 
which is, in fact, greater than the $3#713 exhibited by 
project one. Thus, the firm would benefit from postponement 
as long as project two exhibited a cash throw-off greater 
than $278 per year. 
ASSUMPTION TWO 
The Cash Throw-off from a Project Will Be 
Reinvested at the Highest Obtainable Rate 
Under this assumption the cash throw-off from project 
one will be reinvested at the rate of return that it exhibits 
(14 percent in our example) for the first three years and 
after that will be reinvested at the rate of return enjoyed 
by project two. The necessary cash throw-off from project 
two under this assumption will be found by solving: 
?•/?)*- I 
If 
for x and r. Notice that after the third year the cash 
throw-off from project one will be reinvested at rate r 
alto. Since=%Cand $1,000(1.04P - $1,000 
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$125> the equality can be rewritten as: 
Hto Jm 
v"-* 
It Is easy to see that the cash throw-off from project 
two would only have to be larger than the cash throw-off 
in order to pro- 
ride a larger value at the end of the ten year time hori- 
son. Thus, if the assumption is made that the cosh throw- 
off from eaeh project can be reinvested at the highest 
obtainable rate, project two will only have to exhibit a 
slightly larger cash throw-off than project one* 
ASSUMPTION THREE 
Proceeds Will Be Reinvested at a Company- 
Wide Average Rate 
In the proceeding examples the reinvestment rate as¬ 
sumption made a great deal of difference in the minimum 
cash throw-off required for project two to be superior to 
project one* When reinvestment was assumed at the rate of 
return exhibited by the project, project two had to have a 
cash throw-off greater than $27# to be advantageous* With 
the second assumption the required eash throw-off fell to 
= & 12 S' +- 
0 
Just slightly higher than the $192 cash throw-off from 
project one. Obviously, the firm is left in a quandry. 
The postponement of project one and acceptance of project 
two depends on the reinvestment rate assumption. If the 
firm found that project two would generate $250 per year, 
it would accept project one, if the first assumption were 
made, and would postpone poject one in favor of project two 
if the second assumption were made. The firm is forced to 
determine the appropriate assumption. The correct answer, 
however, is that neither of the first two assumptions is 
valid* The invalidity of assuming that funds generated by 
an investment project can be reinvested at the rate of 
return evidenced by the project Is pointed out by Baldwin. 
It is to one critical assumption under¬ 
lying the usual procedure that I take strong 
exception. The future receipts and payments 
are reduced to their present value by dis¬ 
counting t}em at the same rate as that which 
the proposed investment is estimated to provide. 
In other words, management assumes that, for 
the period between the base point and the time 
when the funds are spent or collected, the funds 
are, or could be, invested at the rate of return 
being calculated for the proposal. 
This is simply not true....The funds would 
be at work during the interim period not at a 
rate similar to that of the proposed investment, 
but at the average rate at which general corpor¬ 
ate funds are being invested -- at the over-all 
value of money to the company.12 
Our previous analysis assumed that future receipts 
^Baldwin, op. clt.. p. 99. 
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wire equally valuable to the firm* That is, the analysis 
concluded that the project with the greatest value at the 
end of the ten year time horizon would be the most benefi¬ 
cial. This is not so. Early receipts will be more valuable 
* . 
to the firm than later receipts. In order to determine the 
relative worth of the projects, the firm mast determine 
the present value of the yearly cash throw-off from each. 
The one exhibiting the greatest present value would then 
be the meat advantageous. The problem is to determine the 
present value discount rate. The answer was provided in 
the above quotation. The firm should discount at a rate 
equal to the over-all value of money to the company. 
Baldwin defines this rate as, ’’.♦.the rate of net 
profit it expects to return on its total assets in the 
years to come.'*^3 He continues: 
In the last analysis the value of money 
must be a judgment determination by management 
because it is a projection into the future. 
Some good, sound guideposts can be set, however, 
by considering the company*a actual performance 
over the most recent four of five years and any 
reasonable estimates of performance for a few 
years ahead. 
An individual project may enjoy a rate of return 
higher or lower than the average rate, but the cash throw- 
off from the project will be placed in the firm's treasury 
p. 100. 
Ujbid., p. 100. 
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The decision ruli can be stated: IT two projects, 
both of which exhibit a rate of return great enough to be 
profitable, have the ease cost but different implementation 
dates, the cash throw-off from the future project must be 
at least high enough to show the same present value as the 
present project when discounted to the present at the 
f 
average value of money to the firm in order to be a de¬ 
sirable undertaking. 
CASE THREE - POSTPCMEMEKT TO 
BfCEEASE PROJECT BENEFIT 
Case three represents a special consideration of post¬ 
ponement that was introduced by Stephen Marglin*^ This 
ease considers the situation of a project whose benefit 
changes with the passage of calendar time* Marglin defines 
calendar time as "...a convenient label for the factors 
which, quite apart from the age of a project, produce 
changes over time in the demands for, and hence the benefits 
of, its output*Thus, if a project produces a certain 
quantity of a physical good year after year, the benefit 
from production will depend on the demand for the good, 
rather than on the age of the project* Of course, demand 
16jbid., pp. 9-10. 
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plays a dominant role in determining the return from any 
Investment. In case three, however, the effects of changes 
in demand are highlighted to show their importance* This 
approach may be employed for determining the benefits of 
postponing any project. For example, take the case of a 
plant whose only output is electric power. The plant la 
capable of producing a certain quantity of electricity, but 
the benefit from the plant will depend on the demand for 
electricity. As long as the quantity demanded is within 
the production capacity of the plant, revenues from the 
plant will depend on the demand. The significance is with 
the effect of changes In demand over time on the planning 
of the investment project. 
In the interest of clarity, only the simplest of eases 
will be considered. This will entail the adoption of assump¬ 
tions which, although detracting from the reality of the 
situation, allow attention to be focused on the problem of 
when to initiate Investment projects. 
Under certain conditions a project that is undesirable1? 
now may become desirable If undertaken in the future. Simi¬ 
larly, projects that are now desirable may become more de¬ 
sirable in the future. It is not enough to determine only 
J-TUndes Arable in this context means that the project exhibits 
a negative net present value when costs and receipts are 
discounted to the present at the average investment return 
rate for the firm. Similarly, desirable means that the pro¬ 
ject exhibits a positive net present value. 
the implementation time that allows the project to show 
positive net present value, but, rather, the implementa¬ 
tion date should be determined that allows maximization of 
the net present value* 
A numerical example will serve to clarify the point. 
Assume that a firm is considering an investment project 
that will cost $1,000 regardless of the Implementation date 
and will yield a certain benefit stream, net of repair cost, 
of $50 per year for years one through 10 (that Is, from 
1963 to 1973) end $200 per year for years 11 through 20 
(that is, from 1974 to 1964)* Assume further that the aver¬ 
age investment rate of return, as defined in case two, is 
10 percent* The assumptions that the dollar cost of the 
project will not change over time and that the revenues are 
known with certainty are admittedly unrealistic, but it allows 
ease of computation without dieting the analysis 
If the project were Implemented now (1963), the present 
value of benefits would be $761*05* 
Present value of benefits from 1963 through 1973• 
6*14&9 x $50 - $307*25 
Present value of benefits from 1974 to 1964: 
2*369 x $200 ~ $473*60 
16jy the reader prefers, the cost may be treated as expected 
cost and the revenues as expected revenues, both discounted 
for uncertainty* 
^Anthony, op* cit*. is the source for the discount factors 
used* 
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$307,25 + $473.30 • $731.05 
Since the construction cost is $1,000, the net present 
value of implementation in year 1963 is negative: -$213.95* 
The project would be undesirable since it would yield a nega¬ 
tive net present value* It is possible, however, that the 
project may become desirable, that is, yield a positive net 
present value, when discounted to 1963 if implemented in fu¬ 
ture years* If, for example, the project is Implemented in 
In 1970, it will exhibit a positive net present value of 
$6.65* 
Present value of revenue, 1971 through 1973: 
1.277 x $50 - $63.35 
Present value of revenue, 1974 through 1934: 
2.369 x $200 ~ $473.30 
$63.35 ♦ $473.30 - $537.65 
Present value of construction cost in 1970: 
.531 x $1,000 - $531.00 
$537.65 - $531 - $6.65 
Therefore, postponement of the project from 1963 until 
1970 allowed a currently undesirable project to become de¬ 
sirable. However, it is not known whether or not implementa¬ 
tion in 1970 provides the most desirable level of operations, 
that is, the greatest net present value. To determine the 
most desirable Implementation date, Marglin suggests con¬ 
sidering the marginal benefit from postponement. 
-70- 
Consider the cost savings of postponement for one year. 
If the project were implemented in year t, the present value 
of the construction coat would be $1,000(1.10 Likewise, 
the present value of the construction cost the following 
year, or year t+1, would be ♦1,000(1.10)*^*^). The dif- 
4 gj , v * j ' • < . » 
ference between these two represents the marginal cost 
saving of a one year postponement • Or, viewed in a slightly 
different light, this would be the present value of the net 
* 
benefits from placing the $1,000, made temporarily available 
by postponing the project for one year, in a one year in¬ 
vestment at a 10 percent rate of interest. 
Mathematically, this 1st 
$1,000(1.10)-* - $l,000(l.lortt+1J (3.1) 
Simplifying, this expression becomess 
$1,000 at .10 * (l.lO)-^1) - $100(1.10)-U+1) (3.2) 
Postponing the project one year also naans that the 
firm must forego ono year’s beneELt. This amounts to: 
50(l.loHt+1) where t - 0...19 (3*3a) 
and 200(1.10)"^fc ^ where t - 20...29 (3.3b) 
The change in net present value from a ona year postponement 
(year t to ya&r t+1) ie the difference between the savings 
in cost and the loss in benefit which Marglin calls tha 
"marginal net present value of delaying construction720 for 
one year. This becomes expression (3*3) minus expression 
^^Karglin, op. cit.. p. 14* 
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(3*2) ori 050(1*10)**^ ^ where t ** 0.«*19 
and -0100(1.10 T^^where t - 20*.,29 
Until 1973# then, (assuming 1963 represent!* year aero) 
the marginal net present value of delaying construction is 
positive. That is, the present value of the savings in coat 
exceeds the present value of the loss in benefit* Thus, 
* 
postponement la advantageous* From 1974 to 1933, however, 
the marginal net present value of delaying construction is 
negative and the firm would suffer a loss in marginal net 
present value by further postponement. Therefore, the 
maximum net present value is that obtained by implementing 
the project in 1973* The net present value reaches a maxi¬ 
mum of $37.30 at that point* 
Present value of construction cost in 1973** 
.336 x 01,000 « 0336 
Present value of benefit 1974 through 1934: 
1*369 x 0200 * 0473*30 
t , ' 
$473*30 - 0336 - $37.30 
Thus, delaying, or postponing, this special type of 
project until 1973 resulted in an undesirable project becom¬ 
ing desirable. This case of a project whose benefit is 
dependent on ircalendar time is not often encountered and 
thus was treated as a special case of postponement. In addi¬ 
tion, the example used was highly simplified in order to 
clarify the discussion. However, the simplifying assumptions 
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could easily be lifted without altering the decision rule. 
It is of note that the use of the case three decision rule 
can be applied to any project whose benefit depends on 
'calendar time,” regardless of whether the project current¬ 
ly shows a positive net present value or not. 
The decision rule can be stated: the firm will maximise 
/ 
the net present value of any project whose benefit depends 
on ncalendar time,” by implementing the project during the 
first year in which the marginal net present value of post¬ 
ponement is positive* 
SmmUT OF DECISION RULES RELATING 
TO POSTPONEMENT 
The attempt of this paper has been to explore the con¬ 
cept of postponement as it relates to capital budgeting 
decisions. The decision rules formulated extend present 
theory. They cover situations in which the use of present 
theory would not lead to the maximisation of equity market 
price. They are intended to demonstrate that the decision 
to postpone, as distinct from the normal accept or reject 
decision, is a usable tool for financial management. 
Case One - Postponement in Order to Lower 
Capital Costs 
When a firm is anticipating a market entry in the fu¬ 
ture, it should postpone those projects which would currently 
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rpquirc market financing but which could be financed 
through funds’ generation over the postponement period, 
in order to increase the market price prior to the antici¬ 
pated market entry. 
Case Two - Postponement Due to Anticipation 
of Future Projects Yielding Greater Eeturna 
If two projects, both of which exhibit a rate of re¬ 
turn great enough to be profitable, have the same cost but 
different implementation dates, the cash throw-off from 
the future project must be at least high enough to show 
the same present value as the present project when discount¬ 
ed to the present at the average value of money to the firm 
in order to be a desirable undertaking* 
Case Three - Postponement to 
Increase Project Benefit 
The firm will maximize the net present value of any 
project whose benefit depends on "calendar time," by im¬ 
plementing the project during the first year in which the 
marginal net present value of postponement is positive. 
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